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Abstract - An operational complexity model (OCM) is 
proposed to enable the complexity of both the cognitive 
and the computational components of a process to be 
determined. From the complexity of formation of a set of 
traces via a specified route a measure of the probability 
of that route can be determined. By determining the 
complexities of alternative routes leading to the 
formation of the same set of traces, the odds indicating 
the relative plausibility of the alternative routes can be 
found. An illustrative application to a BitTorrent piracy 
case is presented, and the results obtained suggest that 
the OCM is capable of providing a realistic estimate of 
the odds for two competing hypotheses. It is also 
demonstrated that the OCM can be straightforwardly 
refined to encompass a variety of circumstances. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
The basis of an operational complexity model (OCM) has 
recently been given by Overill & Silomon [1]. The model is 
based on the general observation that an inverse relationship 
holds between the difficulty and/or intricacy involved in 
performing a task in a specified manner, as measured by its 
intrinsic complexity, and the likelihood that the task in 
question was in fact performed in the specified manner. In 
essence, the idea underpinning the model is that the more 
complex a process is, the less likely it is to occur. 
 
Thus, in the context of a digital forensic examination, the 
operational complexity of formation of a set of digital 
evidential traces by a specified route should in principle be 
susceptible to ‘bottom-up’ ab initio determination. The 
resultant complexity should then be inversely related to the 
probability of formation by that route. 
 
There are many definitions of complexity. Lloyd [2] gives 
several complexity measures that in principle permit the 
complexity of formation of a set of digital evidential traces 
{Ei} to be defined. These metrics include computational 
complexity [3], information based complexity [4], logical 
depth [5], thermodynamic depth (and dive) [6] and 
crypticity [7]. The data available in the problem space of 
digital forensic analysis appears to be most closely aligned 
with the computational complexity metric [3] since the 
remaining candidate metrics require additional information 
or knowledge that is not normally available during a digital 
forensic investigation. In addition, it is desirable to include 
in the model a component relating to the human (i.e. 
cognitive) complexity of the task. The GOMS (Goals, 
Operators, Methods, Selections) family of models offers a 
well-understood approach to the problem. In particular, the 
GOMS Keyboard-Level Model (KLM) [8] provides a 
tractable means of measuring the human involvement in the 
operational process. 
 
The development of the OCM offers forensic examiners and 
expert witnesses the possibility of computing the 
probabilities that a given set of recovered digital evidential 
traces was formed via a number of alternative (mutually 
exclusive) routes, each corresponding to a different 
hypothesis (or narrative) about how the traces were formed. 
These hypotheses are understood to be in competition with 
one another and their relative plausibility will be an 
important factor in deciding whether a successful 
prosecution can be brought. 
 
 
 
 
2. The Operational Complexity Model 
 
The resulting model may be formalized as follows. The 
various feasible routes by which the recovered set of digital 
evidential traces could have been formed are first 
enumerated. For each feasible route k by which the set of 
digital evidential traces {Ei} could have been formed the 
operational complexity of that route is given by: 
 
Ck = KLMk + CCk 
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 where Ck comprises a cognitive complexity component 
specified by the GOMS-KLM model [8] and a suitably 
defined computational complexity (CC) [3] component.  
The operational complexity Ck of each feasible route k and 
its probability of occurrence pk are taken to be inversely 
related: 
 
pk ∝ Ck-1 
 
The constant of proportionality is determined uniquely by 
the normalization condition on the sum of the probabilities 
over all feasible routes k: 
 
 pk = 1 
 
The constant of proportionality Į reflects the units in which 
the complexity of each of the feasible routes k is measured, 
and is given by: 
 
Į = (Ck-1)-1 
 
It should be noted here that while the OCM model makes 
use of a complexity metric it is not based on Shannon 
information theory [9], which would lead to an inverse 
exponential relation: 
 
pk ∝ 2-Ck 
 
Bayesian statistics [10] (which deal with the probability of 
an event A given an event B) have been applied previously 
to generating plausible crime scenarios [11]. However, they 
have only recently been employed in a digital forensic 
analysis context [12], where a Bayesian network model was  
used to study the problem of missing evidence. 
 
The posterior probability of a feasible route k leading to the 
formation of a recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} 
is given by Pr(Hk|{Ei}), where Hk represents the hypothesis 
that feasible route k was taken. The posterior odds for two 
alternative routes k and k’ leading to the formation of the 
same recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} is then 
given by: 
 
O(k:k’) = Pr(Hk|{Ei}) / Pr(Hk’|{Ei}) 
 
Note that the odds are independent of the constant of 
proportionality since Į appears linearly in both the 
numerator and the denominator. 
 
In a digital forensics context, if Hk represents the 
prosecution’s contention regarding the formation of {Ei} 
and Hk’ is the defence’s alternative contention, then the odds 
O(k:k’) provide a measure of the relative plausibility of the 
two competing hypotheses. More generally, if a total of n 
feasible routes are identified which are each capable of 
leading to the formation of the set of recovered traces, then 
the odds that feasible route k was taken are given by: 
 
O(k) = Pr(Hk|{Ei}) / Pr(Hck|{Ei}) 
 
where Hck is the hypothesis that feasible route k was not 
taken, and involves summing the individual probabilities of 
the remaining n-1 feasible routes. 
 
 
 
 
3. Application to the BitTorrent Case 
 
To illustrate the use of the operational complexity model 
outlined above we give here an application to the BitTorrent 
case described previously [12]. The prosecution case is 
taken to be exactly as described in [12], that is, the seized 
computer was used as the initial seeder to share the pirated 
file on a BitTorrent network; see also Figure 1 in the 
Appendix. The defence’s alternative explanation for the 
presence of the recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} 
has been constructed as follows. A Trojan horse program 
carrying the multimedia file as part of its payload installed 
itself on the defendant’s unprotected computer and invoked 
the μTorrent client to upload the multimedia file to a peer-
to-peer (P2P) file sharing website, before finally 
uninstalling itself. 
 
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions for the 
purposes of this illustration. The computer was assumed to 
be running an MS Windows-like environment; the Trojan 
horse program is not equipped with its own life-support 
system; the computer is not protected by an operational 
firewall or anti-malware scanner. The basic unit of the 
GOMS-KLM characterization of cognitive information 
processing is taken to be the mouse button press or release; 
similarly, the basic unit of information processing used in 
characterizing the computational complexity is the byte. 
Disk accesses are assumed to take place autonomously and 
concurrently with CPU- and RAM-based processes. Given 
these assumptions and using documented typical or limiting 
values for all other quantities (see Tables 1-5 in the 
Appendix for full details) we obtain the following results: 
 
 
KLMk = 510 
 
KLMk’ = 0 
 
CCk = N + 20N/219 + 1,844,346 
 
CCk’ = (23/5)N + 20N/219 + 9,938,941 
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 Taking a typical value for the size of the multimedia file as 
N = 4GB, we obtain: 
 
CCk = 4,296,975,482 
 
CCk’ = 19,766,952,343 
 
 
Hence, providing that route k’ is the only feasible alternative 
to route k, we find O(k:k’) § 4.60, indicating that the 
prosecution’s case is 4.6 times more plausible than the 
defence’s case, given the recovered evidence. Alternatively, 
in the absence of any other feasible explanations, the 
probability that the prosecution’s case is correct is § 82%. 
 
 
 
 
4. Refinement of the Model 
 
It is possible to make straightforward refinements to the 
simple operational complexity model given in Section 2 
above in a number of ways. For example, given the result 
obtained in Section 3 above for the BitTorrent case [12] 
with an unprotected computer, a forensic examiner or expert 
witness might wish to know how the computed odds would 
change if an up-to-date anti-malware scanner were in fact 
installed and operational on the computer. This can be 
determined by making use of published values for the 
success rates of Trojan horse interception by commercially 
available anti-malware scanners. Current average values 
quoted by commercial anti-malware providers are typically 
§ 98% [13], although independent comparative surveys do 
not appear to be publicly available. As a consequence, the 
probability of the Trojan horse narrative is reduced from § 
18% to § 0.36% in this scenario. 
 
A further refinement that has been considered is the most 
appropriate relative weighting between the cognitive and 
computational components of the operational complexity 
metric. It can be persuasively argued that the cognitive 
component should be scaled by the ratio of the processing 
rates of the human and the computer, typically § 107. In that 
case,  
 
CCk = 9,396,975,482 
 
and O(k:k’) § 2.10, decreasing the plausibility of the 
prosecution’s case to § 68%. Combining this result with the 
Trojan horse interception scenario yields a slightly 
increased probability of § 0.64% for this narrative. 
 
A further consideration is that of disk access. The model 
implicitly assumes that disk transfers are effectively 
‘hidden’ by means of an autonomous concurrent process, 
such as that implemented by a DMA channel. An alternative 
approach would be to adopt a typical RAM-to-disk access 
times ratio for data transfers so that the DSK actions in the 
analysis (Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix) can be treated 
explicitly. If a typical value of 105 is adopted for this ratio 
then the following results are obtained: 
 
CCk = 9,398,875,482 
 
CCk’ = 19,768,052,343 
 
yielding O(k:k’) § 2.10, as previously. 
 
The most appropriate levels of granularity for different parts 
of the complexity metric are still under consideration. One 
possible option is to use a more coarse-grained metric for 
repetitive byte-wise operations, such as copying a large 
multimedia file, such that these operations are represented 
as single macros. An advantage of this approach would be 
that copying a 2N-byte file would not be considered to 
possess twice the operational complexity of copying an N-
byte file. 
 
 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The recently developed operational complexity model 
enables the complexity of both the cognitive and the 
computational components of a process to be determined. 
From the complexity of formation of a set of traces via a 
specified route the probability of that route can be 
determined. By determining the complexities of alternative 
routes leading to the formation of the same set of traces, the 
odds indicating the relative plausibility of the alternative 
narratives of formation can be found. An illustrative 
application to the previously discussed BitTorrent case [12] 
has been presented, and the results obtained suggest that the 
proposed operational complexity model is capable of 
providing a realistic estimate of the odds for two competing 
hypotheses. It has also been demonstrated that the model is 
capable of straightforward refinement to encompass a 
variety of circumstances, such as relative rates of human vs. 
computer processing, RAM vs. disk access, and the 
presence of security measures. These features should 
provide valuable support for forensic examiners and expert 
witnesses seeking to assess the strength of a case given the 
recovered digital evidence. 
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 Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES: 
 
H The seized computer was used as the initial seeder to 
share the pirated file on a BitTorrent network 
 
H1 The pirated file was copied from the seized optical disk 
to the seized computer 
 
H2 A torrent file was created from the copied file 
 
H3 The torrent file was sent to newsgroups for publishing 
 
H4 The torrent file was activated, which caused the seized 
computer to connect to the tracker server 
 
H5 The connection between the seized computer and the 
tracker server was maintained 
EVIDENCE: 
 
E1 Modification time of the destination file equals that of 
the source file 
 
E2 Creation time of the destination file is after its own 
modification time 
 
E3 Hash value of the destination file matches that of the 
source file 
 
E4 BitTorrent client software is installed on the seized 
computer 
 
E5 File link for the shared file is created 
 
E6 Shared file exists on the hard disk 
 
E7 Torrent file creation record is found 
 
E8 Torrent file exists on the hard disk 
 
E9 Peer connection information is found 
 
E10 Tracker server login record is found 
 
E11 Torrent file activation time is corroborated by its MAC  
time and link file 
 
E12 Internet history record about the publishing website is 
found 
 
E13 Internet connection is available 
 
E14 Cookie of the publishing website is found 
 
E15 URL of the publishing website is stored in the web 
browser 
 
E16 Web browser software is available 
 
E17 Internet cache record about the publishing of the torrent 
file is found 
 
E18 Internet history record about the tracker server 
connection is found 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 BitTorrent Network Diagram [10] 
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  KLM Operator  Normalised Value 
K (key press & release) 2 
   
P (point mouse) 11 
   
B (button press/ release) 1 
   
H (hand to/from keyboard) 4 
   
M (mental preparation) 12 
 
Table 1 KLM Operators and Normalised Values 
 
 
 
Var-
iable Description BT specific value 
      
N no. data bytes in file to be shared 4GB 
NTHC no. data bytes of Trojan Horse Code 128KB 
NTHD 
no. data bytes in Trojan Horse 
Dropper program (N+NTHC)/IFL 
NTC no. data bytes in Torrent Client 7MB 
NTCI 
no. data bytes in Torrent Client 
Installation file 276KB 
NDI no. data bytes in Desktop.ini file 47B 
      
TD TimeDate read or write 8B 
TFN Torrent File Name  256B 
TFL Torrent File Length 4B 
TPL Torrent Piece Length 4B 
TPS Torrent PieceSize 512KB 
TAU Tracker Announce URL 35B 
      
IFL Inflation factor (unzip) 1.25 
      
DSK Disk access (assumed autonomous) 0 
      
PCI Peer Connection Information process 52B + 3TD + DSK 
TSL Tracker Server Login process 60B + 3TD + DSK 
PG Page creation process (webpage) 600KB + TD + DSK 
CO Cookie creation process 256B + TD + DSK 
CA Cache creation process 16B + TD + DSK 
      
 
Table 3 Definitions and Values of Variables used in the Analyses 
 
 Action M P B K H Total 
               
1 Drag and Drop 2 2 2 0 0 48 
2 Double click 1 1 4 0 0 27 
3 Single click 1 1 2 0 0 25 
4 Create torrent 5 6 10 0 0 136 
5 Upload torrent 5 5 10 0 0 125 
6 Type URL 2 1 4 16 2 79 
7 Log in (username/pw) 4 2 4 16 4 122 
 
Table 2 Frequent KLM Actions and Values 
 
 
 
Route k (Criminal) 
Evidence (see [10]) 
KLM 
action DSK Bytes 
E1 (incl. E2, 3, 5, 6) 1 3 N + 7TD 
E4 0 0 0 
E7 (incl. E8) 2+4 5 
20N/TPS + TFN + 
TFL + TPL + TAU 
+ 11TD 
E9 (incl. E10-12, 14, 15, 17, 18) 2+3+5+7 11 
3PG + CO + 3CA + 
NDI + PCI + TSL + 
17TD 
E13 , E16 0 0 0 
 
Table 4 Complexity of the Criminal Route 
 
Route k’ (Trojan) 
Evidence (see [10]) 
KLM 
action DSK Bytes 
DSI (Dropper S/W Install) 0 1 NTHD + 3TD 
DSU (Dropper S/W 
Uninstall) 0 1 NTHD + 3TD 
TSI (Trojan S/W Install, 
payload copy incl. E1, 2, 3, 5, 6) 0 4 NTHD*IFL + N + 10TD 
E4 0 1 
16 + NTCI  + NTC + 
3TD 
E7 (incl. E8) 0 2 
20N/TPS + TFN + 
TFL + TPL + TAU + 
4TD 
E9 (incl. E10-12, 14, 15, 17, 18) 0 11 
3PG + CO + 3CA + 
NDI + PCI + TSL + 
17TD 
E13 , E16 0 0 0 
TSU (Trojan S/W 
Uninstall) 0 1 NTHD*IFL + 3TD 
 
Table 5 Complexity of the Trojan Route 
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